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Since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decisions on
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs' and
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,2 some commentators and
judges have inferred that the Court is moving toward a "unified the-
ory" by which all questions of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction can
be analyzed.' According to these observers, little substantive difference
exists between the modern doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion,4 which permit "a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a
party or claim normally outside of federal judicial power." 5 Conse-
1. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
3. Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory
of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1938 (1982); see Matasar, Rediscover-
ing "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test
for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (1983)[hereinafter Matasar, "One
Constitutional Case"]; Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The
Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 103 (1983) [here-
inafter Matasar, Supplemental Jurisdiction]; Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Juris-
diction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1975). See also
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989 n.49 (3d Cir. 1984) (Judge
Becker noted that "the general approach of [Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancil-
lary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935
(1982) is] an intelligent way of systematizing the decisions in this area.").
Congress impliedly adopted this view of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in recent
legislation intended to overrule Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989). See S.
Res. 2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 17,580-81 (1990). The new statute, §
1367 of Title 28, provides, among other things, that:
[11n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
4. See Matasar, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 105.
5. Id. at 104 n.1; see also Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemen-
tal Jurisdiction, 1987 DuKE L.J. 34 n.1 (distinguishes the two as follows: "[Plendent
jurisdiction is exercised over nonfederal claims asserted by a plaintiff as part of a federal
question suit. Ancillary jurisdiction involves claim or party joinder instituted by a party
1
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quently, commentators view these two doctrines as theoretically simi-
lar and have articulated a single test, or "unified theory," by which any
question of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction can be analyzed.
6
This test may be a valid way to analyze the typical pendent and
ancillary questions presented by Gibbs and Kroger. It fails, however, to
take into account the other types of jurisdictional issues that courts
also label ancillary.7 For example, under the traditional view, the
power of federal courts to enforce their judgments falls within their
ancillary jurisdiction.8 This type of ancillary jurisdiction, however,
raises issues that differ from those raised by claims that are asserted
directly in the primary action. As long as the judgment creditor seeks
to bring only the judgment debtor before the court in an enforcement
proceeding, the federal court that rendered the judgment undoubtedly
has subject matter jurisdiction over that proceeding.9 A different ques-
tion arises, however, when the judgment creditor seeks to satisfy the
judgment by bringing into federal court a nondiverse third party that
was a stranger to the original action.10 Does a court have subject mat-
or nonparty.").
6. See Note, supra note 3, at 1953. The test consists of three steps and requires
the court to (1) determine whether the ancillary and principal claims derive from a
"common nucleus of operative fact," (2) examine "the difference between joining a claim
and adding a party," examine the "posture" in which the ancillary claim is asserted, and
measure that posture against the jurisdictional statute under which the case is brought
to see if the exercise of jurisdiction would violate federal policy, and (3) weigh prudential
factors such as convenience, fairness, and judicial economy to determine whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is proper. Id.
7. See, e.g., Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401 (1893) (supplemental and ancillary
bill to enforce previous judgment of federal court within court's jurisdiction, without
regard to citizenship of the parties); O'Brien County v. Brown, 18 F. Cas. 523 (C.C.D.
Iowa 1871) (No. 10,399) (court has jurisdiction of bill in equity against assignee of judg-
ment creditor to set aside judgment for fraud, even though parties are from same state,
because the bill is a continuation of original suit). Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now solve most of the problems that, before the Rules, were addressed by a
court's ancillary powers, these other uses of a court's ancillary power may appear minor
from a twentieth-century perspective. For example, under equity practice, courts could
entertain supplemental bills that had the effect of amending the pleadings. The Rules
have incorporated this practice and simplified it. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
8. See Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937); Root, 150 U.S. at
410-11; Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217, 221
(1884).
9. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 171-73 (1867).
10. Three recent federal appellate court decisions illustrate the dispute in this area.
See Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483 (7th Cir. 1988); Skevofilax v.
Quigley, 810 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); Berry v. McLemore,
795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986). In each of these cases the third party who, according to the
judgment creditor, had a duty to pay the judgment, challenged the jurisdiction of the
federal court to enforce a judgment that it had previously rendered. The courts in
Argento and Skevofilax found that the federal courts do have jurisdiction to enforce'
[Vol. 42
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ter jurisdiction over enforcement actions which include nondiverse,
third-party strangers to the original action? If so, in what situations is
this jurisdiction proper?11
When applied to enforcement questions, the "unified theory" fails
to take into account the special issues raised by the application of an-
cillary jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings. Analyzing the "com-
mon nucleus of operative facts,"12 examining the posture of the claim,
their judgments in this situation, but the court in Berry ruled that it does not. See infra
notes 175-208 and accompanying text.
11. Pursuant to Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to enforce its
judgment a Federal Court uses the procedure of the state in which it sits. FED. R. Civ. P.
69(a). Most states provide for supplementary proceedings that allow a judgment creditor
to reach those assets of a judgment debtor that are in the hands of a third party. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-39-10 to -900 (Law. Co-op. 1976). These supplementary pro-
ceedings are a substitute for the creditor's bill in equity. See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S.
105, 107 (1936).
Most states also provide for postjudgment garnishment to allow a judgment creditor
to reach the assets of the judgment debtor that are in the hands of third persons. See C.
DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES § 451
(1885). The theory of postjudgment garnishment generally is the same as the theory of
supplementary proceedings and creditor's bills. See Pratt v. Albright, 9 F. 634, 639
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1881) (compares garnishment to other supplementary proceedings and
notes that garnishment actions should be ancillary because a creditor's bill is ancillary).
See infra note 48. Some difference of opinion exists, however, about whether or not gar-
nishment is an ancillary remedy. Compare London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Courtney,
106 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1939) (construes Oklahoma law to find a writ of garnishment to
be an independent action) with American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613 (7th
Cir. 1939) (construes Illinois law to find garnishment to be an ancillary proceeding). As
argued below, whether state law characterizes an action as ancillary should not bind a
federal court with respect to its jurisdiction. See infra notes 136-37. Because postjudg-
ment garnishment serves the same function as supplementary proceedings, a writ of gar-
nishment filed to enforce a judgment should be ancillary to that action.
Because the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot expand or limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, whether the rules provide a way to reach the assets of a judgment debtor
in the hands of a third party is a separate issue from whether a federal court can prop-
erly take jurisdiction over the claim against that third party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
However, the procedural issue is often confused with the jurisdictional issue. See, e.g.,
Argento, 838 F.2d at 1489; Skevofilax, 810 F.2d at 390 (J. Stapleton, dissenting). See
infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text. This Note addresses the jurisdictional ques-
tion and will only discuss the procedural issue as it impacts the various decisions of the
federal courts.
12. The Supreme Court adopted this test, which is traditionally applied to pendent
jurisdiction questions, to analyze the ancillary question presented in Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). The Court in Kroger noted that pendent
and ancillary questions are "two species of the same generic problem: Under what cir-
cumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citi-
zens of the same State?" Id. at 370. See also Matasar, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra
note 3, at 150 (several courts and commentators have stated that Gibbs sets forth consti-
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and weighing the prudential factors, as the unified theory requires, ig-
nores the distinction between the types of claims brought in a primary
action and those brought in an enforcement action. For example, a tort
claim that results in an award of money damages is completely differ-
ent from a claim against an insurer who owes a contractual duty to pay
those damages. Thus, the "common nucleus of operative facts" test has
little application in the typical enforcement context.13 Moreover, the
test gives only slight weight to the federal courts' fundamental interest
in enforcing their own judgments.1
4
This Note argues that enforcement jurisdiction is not "ancillary"
as that term is usually defined, and federal courts should not use a
unified theory analysis to determine enforcement jurisdiction ques-
tions. Instead, enforcement jurisdiction questions should be analyzed
according to legal principles applicable to this specific area of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.' 5 According to these principles, simply
stated, federal jurisdiction over an enforcement proceeding is proper
when the proceeding is merely a continuation of the primary action.'
In other words, when the judgment creditor seeks to reach assets of the
judgment debtor, jurisdiction is proper even if a third-party stranger to
the judgment who has possession of those assets must be brought into
the proceedings.
This rule's simplicity is deceptive, however, and its application has
varied widely. For example, because the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure incorporate state law for purposes of enforcing a judgment, 1
some courts rely on state law to determine whether an enforcement
13. Cf. Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 3, at 1453-54 (argues that
the Gibbs fact-relatedness test is inadequate even when applied to the primary action,
and that the policies of Gibbs are better served by a "same transaction or occurrence" or
a "logical relationship" test).
14. As the Supreme Court noted in Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 51 (1825):
The judicial power would be incomplete, and entirely inadequate to the pur-
poses for which it was intended, if, after judgment, it could be arrested in its
progress, and denied the right of enforcing satisfaction in any manner which
shall be prescribed by the laws of the United States. The authority to carry
into complete effect the judgments of the Courts, necessarily results, by impli-
cation, from the power to ordain and establish such Courts.
Id, at 53.
15. Because in the nineteenth century the term "ancillary" referred, in part, to the
power of a court to enforce and regulate its judgments, the term "ancillary" will be used
in this Note to refer to enforcement jurisdiction questions. However, today the court's
power to enforce its judgments is more appropriately seen as falling within its "enforce-
ment jurisdiction," because the term "ancillary" has lost its nineteenth-century meaning.
16. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
17. See FED. R Civ. P. 69(a).
[Vol. 42
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proceeding is a continuation of the primary action.18 Other courts have
developed a bright-line rule that all enforcement actions of a certain
type are independent and, hence, not continuations of the primary ac-
tions."9 As this Note will show, neither approach is correct.20
This rule and its meaning can be understood only in the context of
nineteenth-century equity practice. The nineteenth-century federal
courts, applying the tenets of equity to the problems posed by their
limited jurisdiction, created the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. En-
forcement jurisdiction was one aspect of this doctrine. 2 To place en-
forcement jurisdiction in its proper context, therefore, Part II of this
Note will review nineteenth-century federal equity practice, how that
practice affected the earlier uses of the federal courts' ancillary powers,
and how it provided a theoretical basis for enforcement jurisdiction.
Part III will propose a method for analyzing enforcement questions
and contrast that method with the modern doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction. Part IV applies this analytical method to three recent appel-
late court decisions 22 to show its usefulness in resolving enforcement
jurisdiction questions.
18. See, e.g., Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483 (7th Cir. 1988)
(jurisdiction proper because Illinois law allowed statute in question to be enforced in
same action).
19. See, e.g., Berry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no jurisdiction be-
cause garnishment actions are separate and independent under Fifth Circuit precedent
and no independent basis for jurisdiction exists).
20. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
21. When viewed in the context of equitable procedure, this doctrine is more con-
sistent than some authorities suggest. See, e.g., 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3523 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
MILLER] (calling the concept "ill-defined"). Since the merger of law and equity and the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ancillary jurisdiction is only indi-
rectly based on equitable concepts. The modern doctrine focuses on (1) the factual rela-
tionship of the ancillary claim to the primary action, (2) its posture before the court, and
(3) the discretionary policies articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966) and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Many of the
Rules are derived from the former equity rules, however, and modern ancillary jurisdic-
tion is an attempt to "balance federal subject matter jurisdiction requirements with the
liberal provisions of the rules as to joinder." 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 3523, at 95-
96. Thus the modern concept of ancillary jurisdiction still has its roots in equity. See
Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 3, at 1484-86 n.387.
22. The three cases include: Argento, 838 F.2d at 1483; Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810
F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); Berry, 795 F.2d at 452. See infra
notes 179-216 and accompanying text.
1991]
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II. THE EQUITABLE BASIS OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
A. Federal Equity Practice
Article III of the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act expressly
maintained the distinction between law and equity.2 3 Moreover, al-
though Congress initially provided that the procedure of the federal
courts sitting in law should conform as closely as possible to the proce-
dure of the courts in the states in which they sat,24 the rule was differ-
ent when the federal courts sat in equity. Procedure in equity was uni-
form throughout the federal judicial system. The precedents of the
English Chancery Courts, modified by the equitable rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court, governed equity proceedings. 2 As a result, if
the English Chancery could provide relief in a certain situation, then
the federal courts could provide similar relief.
26
This relief was, theoretically at least, very broad.27 According to
Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, the nature of
equity jurisprudence is understood best if it is distinguished from legal
jurisprudence. As Story noted, the common-law courts of the time
could hear only "certain prescribed forms of action, to which the party
[had to] resort to furnish him a remedy. '28 Therefore, if the existing
prescribed forms were not appropriate for a particular case, the party
was .without remedy at law.29 In such cases the courts of equity could
be flexible:
[Courts of equity] may adjust their decrees, so as to meet most, if not
all, of these exigencies; and they may vary, qualify, restrain, and
23. Article III, section 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in
Law and Equity." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides "[t]hat suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where [a] plain, ade-
quate and complete remedy may be had at law." Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,
ch. 28, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789).
24. Process Act of September 2 , 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (1789).
25. Id. at 93-94 (reaffirmed and amended to allow Supreme Court to regulate pro-
cedure in equity by rule in Process Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276
(1792)). See also Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 3, at 1484, 1486 n.387
(argues that current practice is "not an unacceptable alteration of the practice existing at
the time of the framing of the Constitution" and the adoption of the Process Act of
September 29, 1789 demonstrated Congress's support of the potentially broad uses of
equitable procedure).
26. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564
(1851).
27. See Matasar, "One Constitutional Case," supra note 3, at 1484 n.387.
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model the remedy, so as to suit it to mutual and adverse claims, con-
trolling equities, and the real and substantial rights of all the parties.
Nay, more; they can bring before them all parties interested in the
subject matter, and adjust the rights of all, however numerous;
whereas Courts of Common Law are compelled to limit their inquiry
to the very parties in the litigation before them .... 30
In fact, courts of equity required that any bill presented "be so
framed as to afford ground for such a decision upon the whole matter,
at one and the same time, as may, as far as possible, prevent future
litigation concerning it."31 To achieve this end, equitable procedure
provided for joinder of claims and parties,3 ' cross-bills,33 bills of inter-
pleader,'34 bills of discovery, 35 bills of revivor, s and supplemental
bills.37 While the objective of common-law procedure was the reduction
of the controversy to a single legal or factual issue between only two
parties, the objective of equitable procedure was the complete and just
determination of the controversy in one action.
38
The policies of equity thus were to do complete justice in a single
action and avoid multiple lawsuits. However, these policies often con-
flicted with the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. To resolve
this conflict, the federal courts turned to equitable jurisdiction and eq-
uitable procedure. Equitable jurisdiction gave the court the power to
hear auxiliary bills, which allowed a court of equity to aid parties to an
action at law.39 Equitable procedure provided the device known as the
dependent supplemental bill, by which a court of equity could adjudi-
cate claims related to the primary action.40 Courts often confused these
two concepts because they viewed auxiliary bills as dependent by defi-
nition. Auxiliary bills and supplemental bills were, however, technically
distinct, with distinct applications.41 These applications provided ways
to balance the inclusive policies of equity with the limitations on fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.
30. Id. § 28, at 27.
31. 1 E. DANIELL, DANIELL'S CHANCERY PRACTICE 379 (Perkins First Am. ed. 1846).
32. See id. at 240-41, 379-80.
33. 3 E. DANIELL, supra note 31, at 1742-52.
34. Id. at 1753-68.
35. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1483, at 700-02 (1836).
36. 3 E. DANIELL, supra note 31, at 1693-1717.
37. Id. at 1653-85.
38. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY §§ 8-9, at 11 (1936).
39. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
1991]
7
Glenn: Federal Supplemental Enforcement Jurisdiction
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1. Jurisdiction in Equity
As Story noted, equity jurisdiction was confined to situations in
which "a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the
Courts of Common Law. '4 2 This jurisdiction was even more inclusive
than this phrase implies:
The remedy must be plain; for, if it be doubtful and obscure at law,
equity will assert a jurisdiction. It must be adequate; for, if at law it
falls short of what the party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction
in Equity. And it must be complete; that is, it must attain the full end
and justice of the case.4
3
Because of the limitations of legal procedure, therefore, courts of eq-
uity could provide relief in several different categories of cases. Equita-
ble jurisdiction was "sometimes concurrent with the jurisdiction of a
[c]ourt of law; it [was] sometimes exclusive of it; and it [was] some-
times auxiliary to it." By means of the latter, equity could in some
cases assist parties to actions at law .'
A court of equity could exercise its auxiliary jurisdiction to assist a
court of law "in a variety of cases, in which the administration of jus-
tice could not otherwise be usefully or successfully attained. ' 40 For ex-
ample, the chancellor could permit bills for discovery so that, contrary
to legal procedural rules, parties to a suit at common law would be
required to produce documents and testimony to help the plaintiff
prove facts known only to the defendant.47 Also, if a party obtained a
42. 1 J. STORY, supra note 28, § 33, at 32 (footnote omitted). See also Judiciary Act
of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789) ("[S]uits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate
and complete relief can be had at law.").
43. 1 J. STORY, supra note 28, § 33, at 32 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
45. 2 J. STORY, supra note 35, §§ 1480-1481, at 699. Story also refers to this type of
jurisdiction as supplemental or assistant jurisdiction. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 28, § 75,
at 92. The term "supplemental" in this context apparently means "ancillary." The use of
the term "supplemental" to refer to this type of jurisdiction can lead to confusion be-
cause equitable practice provided for a type of bill known as a supplemental bill. See
infra note 53 and accompanying text. Technically, a party filed an auxiliary bill in aid of
an action at law and filed a supplemental bill in aid of an action in equity. See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text. In general, though, the word "supplemental" could
encompass any bill filed as an adjunct to a primary action, and thus the words "supple-
mental" and "supplementary" were sometimes used to refer to matters that were consid-
ered auxiliary in the strict sense of equitable procedure.
46. 2 J. STORY, supra note 35, § 1481, at 69.
47. Id. § 1483, at 700. Section 15 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the
federal courts sitting at law had the same power to entertain bills of discovery as pro-
vided "by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery." Judiciary Act of September 24,
[Vol. 42
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common-law judgment that he could not satisfy by legal procedures, he
could file a creditor's bill in equity to discover and reach equitable as-
sets of the debtor or to set aside any fraudulent conveyances made by
the debtor.4 Moreover, to prevent injustice, a bill in equity could be
filed to restrain or regulate a judgment in a suit at law 9 or to allow a
party to assert an equitable defense that the party could not have as-
serted in the suit at law.
50
These auxiliary bills were, by definition, dependent on the under-
lying legal action, because equity's jurisdiction to aid an action at law
did not exist until the court had a properly filed legal action before it.5 1
Therefore, the court viewed auxiliary bills as a continuation of the un-
derlying legal action,5 2 and the court's jurisdiction over such a bill de-
pended on its jurisdiction over the underlying legal action. This auxil-
iary power of a court of equity was one source of the nineteenth-
century doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
53
2. Equitable Procedure
A second source of ancillary jurisdiction is found in the equitable
concept of the dependent bill. Although equitable procedure was flexi-
ble, it was complex and technical. Bills were generally divided into two
classes. First, "Original Bills . . . relate[d] to some matter not before
litigated in the [c]ourt by the same persons, standing in the same in-
terests."'54 Second, bills not original, also called dependent bills, added
to or continued an original bill and related to some matter already liti-
gated by the same parties.55 Moreover, this last class included bills
"brought for the purpose of cross litigation, or of controverting, or sus-
pending, or reversing some decree or order of the Court, or of obtaining
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789). Courts of equity could also preserve testimony for use
in a court of law. 2 J. STORY, supra note 35, §§ 1505-1512, at 718-23.
48. See H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 38, § 203, at 358. See also Dewey v. West
Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329, 332-33 (1887) (court had jurisdiction over credi-
tor's bill to set aside fraudulent conveyance because action was ancillary to action at law
and, thus, could be maintained regardless of citizenship of parties); Marsh v. Burroughs,
16 F. Cas. 800, 802 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 9,112) ("A judgment creditor, who has ex-
hausted his legal remedy, may pursue, in a court of equity, any equitable interest, trust
or demand of his debtor, in whosesoever hands it may be.").
49. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
50. See, e.g., Johnson v. Christian, 125 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1888).
51. A dependent bill in equity was one that related to an already existing original
bill in equity. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Hatch v. Dorr, 11 F. Cas. 805, 806 (C.C.D. Mich. 1846) (No. 6,206).
53. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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the benefit of a former decree, or of carrying it into execution . ...
These bills had some of the qualities of original bills and some of the
qualities of dependent bills. Furthermore, if the bills rested on new
facts or required additional parties to be brought before the court, they
were called supplemental bills, a subclass of dependent bills.
5 7
In equity, a party filed a supplemental bill to either cure a defect
in the original pleadings or add newly discovered material or parties
whose relationship to the controversy came to light after the pleadings
had been filed. 8 A party could file a supplemental bill any time after
filing the suit, even after the court entered its decree.59 A party could
bring a postdecree supplemental bill to request the court to enforce or
clarify the decree.60 The bills could bring new parties, including de-
fendants, before the court 1 and request the court to "give directions,
which were not prayed by the original bill, but which the result of the
proceedings under the decree [had] rendered proper."82 However, a
postdecree supplemental bill had to strictly aid the action already
taken by the court; it could not "vary the principle of the decree," but
was limited to supplying any omission "in the decree or in the proceed-
ings, so as to enable the Court to give full effect to its decision.
6 3
To further complicate matters, supplemental material in some
cases had to be filed by means of "an original bill in the nature of a
supplemental bill."61 4 Equity distinguished those situations in which
the plaintiff's interest was "transmitted to another person coming in
under the same title"6 5 from those in which the plaintiff's interest was
completely vested in another, as in a bankruptcy proceeding or after an
assignment of interest.6 In the former case, a supplemental bill was
sufficient; in the latter, the court required an original bill in the nature
of a supplementary bill.67 If a party had to file an original bill in the
56. Id. § 326, at 265.
57. Id. §§ 333-338, at 269-74.
58. 3 E DANIELL, supra note 31, at 1654.
59. Id. at 1659.
60. Id. at 1660.
61. Id. at 1658-59.
62. Id. at 1660.
63. Id. at 1662. When a supplemental bill enabled the court "to give full effect to
its decision" and when it sought to "vary the principle of the decree," this became a
critical issue in enforcement proceedings. As the cases show, the addition of a new de-
fendant alone would not render a postdecree supplemental bill invalid. If the bill
brought in new parties and asked that new issues be litigated, however, it was not
strictly supplemental. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
64. 3 E. DANIELL, supra note 31, at 1666 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id. at 1667 (emphasis added).
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nature of a supplemental bill, then the court viewed the case, in some
ways, as beginning over:
A new defence [sic] may be made, the pleadings and depositions can-
not be made use of in the same manner as if filed or taken in the same
cause, and the decree, if any has been obtained, is no otherwise of
advantage than as it may be an inducement to the Court to make a
similar decree.68
In other ways, courts viewed the original bill in the nature of a
supplemental bill as an extension of the original bill. 9 For example, if
the interest of a defendant became vested in another party, then the
benefit of the decree had to be obtained by an original bill in the na-
ture of a supplemental bill unless more than one defendant was pre-
sent. In those cases, the court considered the new bill merely supple-
mental.70 As commentators noted, the distinction between these two
bills was primarily a matter of form: even though the court viewed the
case as beginning anew, it could allow the pleadings and depositions of
the prior case to be used in the new proceeding. 71 In fact, as Justice
Story noted, this bill was in effect more supplemental than original.
7 2
3. Summary
Accordingly, a court of equity could assert jurisdiction over "auxil-
iary" or "supplemental" matters primarily in two situations. First, if
an action was at law, a court of equity could use its auxiliary powers to
assist the parties to the action. The court could aid the judgment cred-
itor by reaching equitable and intangible assets of the judgment debtor
or by restraining and regulating the judgment. The court could also
adjudicate claims to property in its custody. 73 Courts viewed an auxil-
iary bill as dependent on the action at law, even if new parties were
68. Id. These distinctions were very technical and, as Daniell admitted, no general
rule existed to determine when one or the other was applicable. Id. at 1667.
69. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 28, § 346, at 280-81.
70. Id. § 351, at 283.
71. See 3 E. DANIELL, supra note 31, at 1686-87. Daniell notes that "there does not
seem to be any general rule . . . determining the cases in which the transmission of
interest of the sole plaintiff renders the one or the other forms of proceeding applicable."
Id. at 1667.
72. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 28, § 16, at 15.
73. See, e.g., Johnson v. Christian, 125 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1888) (judgment debtor
could seek injunction in equity so that he could assert defense not available in legal
action); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861) (parties asserting claim to prop-
erty in custody of court had remedy in equity); Marsh v. Burroughs, 16 F. Cas. 800, 802
(C.C.S.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 9,112) (judgment creditor may file creditor's bill in equity to
pursue equitable interest of judgment debtor).
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named.7 4 Second, if the primary action was in equity, the court had
jurisdiction over dependent supplemental bills.7 5 To determine if the
supplemental bill was original or dependent, the court looked at the
relationship of the parties to the main action and the relief sought.76
Thus, to be dependent, a supplemental bill had to be connected to the
subject matter of the primary claim. As argued below, both auxiliary
and supplemental bills provided the federal courts with procedures for
taking jurisdiction over claims related to the primary action and for
maintaining their jurisdiction over an action until the judgment was
satisfied.
7
B. Nineteenth-Century Ancillary Jurisdiction
When the framers of the Constitution vested equitable judicial
power in the Supreme Court and Congress provided that these powers
were to be exercised uniformly throughout the federal system, a con-
flict between the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the exer-
cise of their equitable powers was inevitable. Equity, with its emphasis
on inclusiveness and liberal joinder of parties and claims, sometimes
directly contradicted the limitations placed on federal jurisdiction by
the Constitution and by the Congress.78 Consequently, a federal court
sitting in diversity could be faced with the choice between doing com-
plete justice as equity demanded or dismissing the case for lack of ju-
risdiction. However, nineteenth-century federal courts managed to de-
velop an accommodation between these two competing demands by
utilizing the traditional distinctions found in equitable jurisdiction and
74. The function of the auxiliary creditor's bill was to reach the equitable assets of
the judgment debtor held by third parties. Thus, claiming that one was not a party to
the underlying action was not a defense to this type of action. See Marsh, 16 F. Cas. at
800.
75. See, e.g., Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401 (1893) (supplemental bill may be
used to enforce previous equitable judgment of federal court). In Root a court of equity
had previously entered a decree against Root that established title in Morton.
Woolworth, who took title through Morton, sought to enforce that decree against Root in
this proceeding. Id. at 402-03. The Supreme Court held that the supplemental bill was
properly brought because Woolworth claimed as an "assignee of a party to the decree"
and, thus, should not be required to institute "an original or independent suit against
Root." Id. at 411 (emphasis in original).
76. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 102-29 and accompanying text.
78. For example, § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 required actions to be filed in
either the district in which the defendant resided or the district in which he was found at
the time the writ was served. Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat.
73, 79 (1789). This provision could have greatly limited equitable joinder devices if the








1. Ancillary Jurisdiction Before Freeman v. Howe s0
The earliest courts that confronted this issue used the equitable
concept of auxiliary jurisdiction and the distinction between original
and dependent bills to solve the problems presented by section 11 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.81 Section 11 required diversity actions to be
filed either in the district in which the defendant resided or in the dis-
trict in which he lived at the time the writ was served.8 2 On the other
hand, equity permitted a defendant in a legal action to file an auxiliary
bill to enjoin enforcement of the judgment.8 3 Because the bill for an
injunction had to be filed in the court that issued the decree, filing an
auxiliary bill in these circumstances violated section 11.
Dunlap v. Stetson8 4 illustrates this dilemma. The defendants in a
prior legal action requested the court to enjoin the enforcement of the
judgment. The plaintiff in the original action, who was the defendant
in the equitable proceeding, argued that the suit should have been filed
in Massachusetts, where he resided.8 5 In an opinion by Justice Story,
the court reasoned that because a bill to enjoin a judgment was auxil-
iary and dependent, it could be maintained in the court that had given
the original decree. Thus section 11 did not apply."
When facing subject matter jurisdiction questions, however, the
79. See infra notes 102-29 and accompanying text.
80. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
81. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Stetson, 8 F. Cas. 75 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) (No. 4,164).
82. Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789).
83. Defendants in legal actions were limited in the kinds of defenses they could
assert. In the interest of justice, therefore, equity would provide the defendant a forum
to assert certain defenses. Accordingly, the defendant could file a bill in equity to enjoin
enforcement of the decree while he litigated his defenses. See Johnson v. Christian, 125
U.S. 642 (1888).
84. 8 F. Cas. 75 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) (No. 4,164).
85. Id. at 75-77.
86. Id. at 79-80. Story also rested this decision on an earlier Supreme Court case,,
Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288 (1809). See Dunlap v. Stetson, 8 F. Cas. 75, 80
(C.C.D. Me. 1827) (No 4,164). In Logan the Supreme Court resolved a jurisdiction ques-
tion concerning a bill to enjoin a prior judgment filed in Kentucky, the state in which the
complainant resided. The plaintiff filed for the injunction in Kentucky rather than in
Virginia, the home state of the defendant. The Supreme Court merely stated that "there
could be no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court below." Logan, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at
289. Story believed this case supported the ruling in Dunlap, but the opinion is so con-
clusory that it does not provide a useful example of the Supreme Court's reasoning on
this issue. Story also pointed out that the rule was necessary to prevent a failure "of all
equitable relief" in situations in which one party had become a citizen of the same state
as the other during the course of the underlying action. Dunlap, 8 F. Cas. at 80.
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Supreme Court originally was not as flexible as the Dunlap court had
been when it faced the section 11 venue question. In Simms v. Guth-
rie 87 Chief Justice Marshall noted that a bill to enjoin a judgment was
not an original bill and must be brought in the court that rendered the
decree.88 He remarked that the federal court's "limited jurisdiction
might possibly create some doubts of the propriety of making citizens
of the same state with the plaintiff parties defendants."8' 9 If the parties
were not diverse, "the Court [could] dispense with parties who would
otherwise be required, and decree as between those before the Court,
since its decree [could not] affect those who [were] not parties to the
suit."8 0 Despite this limiting language, later courts relied on Simms to
justify ignoring the strict requirements of diversity in an injunction ac-
tion, focusing instead on Chief Justice Marshall's view of the bill as
dependent and not original.9 1
The courts eventually applied the concept of auxiliary jurisdiction
and the distinction between original and dependent bills to resolve
subject matter jurisdiction problems. Two early Supreme Court cases
presented similar fact situations.9 2 In Dunn v. Clarke93 the Court con-
sidered a subject matter jurisdiction question when a plaintiff who had
obtained a judgment at law in a circuit court died before the court
executed the judgment .9 The Court determined that the circuit court
had jurisdiction over an action to stay the judgment, even though the
deceased party's representative and the original defendants were all
citizens of Ohio. The Court reasoned that the injunction bill was not
an original bill and that "no change in the residence or condition of the
parties can take away a jurisdiction which has once attached."9 5
The Court limited the action that could be taken by the circuit
87. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 19 (1815).
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Barclay, 21 F. Cas. 212, 213-14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1855) (No. 12,241) (bill to enjoin action at law auxiliary to underlying action may be
maintained in absence of diversity).
92. See Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 1 (1834). A federal circuit court addressed this question earlier and reached the
same result. See Penn v. Klyne, 19 F. Cas. 166 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 10,936) (scire
facias to revive a judgment is a continuation of the original action and may issue in the
name of plaintiff's legal representatives, even though they are citizens of the same state
as the defendant).
93. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834).
94. See id. at 2. The original plaintiff was a citizen of Virginia who brought an
action in ejectment against several citizens of Ohio. The defendants below filed an action
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court, however, on the ground that new parties who were not defend-
ants to the original action had been brought into the action. While
"[t]he injunction bill is not considered an original bill between the
same parties, as at law. . . if other parties are made in the bill, and
different interests [are] involved, it must be considered, to that extent
at least, an original bill."96 To the extent the bill was an original bill,
"the jurisdiction of the circuit court must depend upon the citizenship
of the parties. "
In Clarke v. Mathewson9 the plaintiff filed suit in equity and re-
quested an accounting of certain transactions between the parties, but
died after the case was referred to the master.9 His administrator,
Clarke, filed a bill of revivor.100 The circuit court viewed the bill of
revivor as an original bill and ruled that it did not have jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the bill of revivor was a
continuation of the original suit, not an original bill. As Justice Story
noted:
[I]n courts of equity, an abatement of the suit, by the death of a party
... amounts to a mere suspension, and not to a determination of the
suit. It may again be put in motion by a bill of revivor ... [which] is
the mere continuation of the old suit .... [S]uch bills are treated
not strictly as original bills, but as supplementary or dependent bills,
and [are] so properly within the reach of the court. . ... o
Because the dependent bill in equity continued the prior action, the
court's jurisdiction over it derived from its jurisdiction over the prior
action.
2. Freeman v. Howe 1 2 and its Progeny
Although the distinction between an original and dependent bill
was useful in some circumstances, the distinction could also complicate
matters in situations that concerned new parties, as Simms and Dunn
illustrate. Initially, the Supreme Court was unwilling to take jurisdic-
tion over a dependent bill in equity if it brought new parties into the
96. Id.
97. Id. The solution decreed by the Court was to stay proceedings in the circuit
court until the parties could seek the relief they sought from a state court. Id. at 2-3.
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860) expressly limited this aspect of the
ruling.
98. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838).
99. Id. at 170.
100. Id. Although the original plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut, Clarke and the
original defendants were citizens of Rhode Island. Id.
101. Id. at 171-72.
102. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
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action because it considered such bills to be original."' 3 In two key mid-
nineteenth-century cases,1"4 however, the Supreme Court applied the
rules of equitable procedure more flexibly than it had in Dunn and
expanded the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to embrace situations
involving new parties that destroyed strict diversity.
Freeman v. Howe'05 was the first of these key decisions and is
often cited as the leading ancillary jurisdiction case of the nineteenth
century.106 In Freeman property was in the custody of a federal court
as the result of an action at law.107 The Supreme Court noted that the
parties asserting a claim to the property, even though not diverse,
could file a bill in equity to determine their rights:
The principle is, that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to
restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and
thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage under mesne or
final process, is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, sup-
plementary merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and
is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. 08
The Court cited Dunn v. Clarke'09 and Clarke v. Mathewson'10 in sup-
port of this principle."' Moreover, the decision specifically limited that
103. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
104. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609 (1865).
105. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
106. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 3523, at 87. While the federal
courts before Freeman utilized auxiliary jurisdiction, Freeman was apparently the first
case in which a court used the term "ancillary." For cases that predate Freeman and use
auxiliary jurisdiction to bring nondiverse parties before the court, see St. Luke's Hosp. v.
Barclay, 21 F. Cas. 212 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855) (No. 12,241) (bill to enjoin an action at law
was auxiliary to the underlying action, even though parties were not diverse) and Hatch
v. Dorr, 11 F. Cas. 805 (C.C.D. Mich. 1846) (No. 6,206) (court allowed a creditor's bill to
be maintained in the absence of diversity because it was a continuation of a former
controversy).
107. Freeman, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 453. The original plaintiff, a New Hampshire
resident, filed suit against the Vermont and Massachusetts Railroad Company, a Massa-
chusetts corporation, in the District of Massachusetts Circuit Court. The federal mar-
shall, Freeman, attached a number of railroad cars as security for the satisfaction of a
judgment, if one were rendered. The mortgagees of the railroad company filed an action
for replevin in state court, and as a result, the local sheriff seized the railroad cars. Id.
108. Id. at 460.
109. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1 (1834).
110. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164 (1838).
111. Freeman, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 460. The Court also rested its decision on the
importance of the federal court's power to determine its own jurisdiction, stating that
sending the parties to state court would give the state court the authority to determine
the jurisdiction of the federal court. As the court argued, "no Government could main-
tain the administration or execution of its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its
[Vol. 42
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aspect of the ruling in Dunn which required the additional parties to
file their claims in state court.'12
The second key decision was Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co.1 13 This
case arose out of a bill, brought by a defendant to the underlying ac-
tion, that requested a construction of the lower court's decree. The cir-
cuit court apparently declined to exercise jurisdiction because the bill
was brought by the defendant, contained new subject matter, brought
new parties before the court and, thus, was technically an original bill
in the nature of a supplemental bill.2 4 The Supreme Court reversed
and ruled:
[T]he question is not whether the proceeding is supplemental and an-
cillary or is independent and original, in the sense of the rules of eq-
uity pleading; but whether it is supplemental and ancillary or is to be
considered entirely new and original, in the sense which this court has
sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts from that of the State courts.
115
Because the party requested the circuit court to carry into effect its
"real intention and decree," and the property in question was still
within the court's control, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
was proper.'"
Both Freeman and Minnesota Co. demonstrate the Court's recog-
nition of ancillary jurisdiction as a doctrine that could be used by a
federal court sitting in equity. After these cases, the technical require-
ments of equitable procedure or a strict interpretation of the diversity
requirement no longer limited jurisdiction."' Instead, the courts began
to apply the flexible spirit of equity and ignore the requirements of
strict diversity when faced with auxiliary and supplemental bills." 8
The federal courts were no longer "confined to the line which, in chan-
judicial tribunals were subject to the determination of another.!' Id. at 459.
112. Id. at 460. Although Freeman specifically restricted Dunn, some later courts
relied on Dunn's limiting language when they declined to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Anglo-Florida Phosphate Co. v. McKibben, 675 F. 529 (5th Cir. 1894); Conwell v. White
Water Valley Canal Co., 7 F. Cas. 372 (C.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 3,148).
113. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 609 (1864).
114. Id. at 624, 633-35.
115. Id. at 633.
116. Id. at 633-35.
117. In Dunn the Supreme Court required the additional parties to take their prop-
erty claims to state court. Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 2-3 (1834); see also Simms
v. Guthrie, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 19, 25 (1815) (Chief Justice Marshall remarked that while
a bill to enjoin a judgment at law must be brought in the same court that rendered the
decree, parties who were citizens of the same state as plaintiffs could not be made de-
fendants to the bill and, thus, the decree would not affect absent parties).
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cery pleadings, divides original bills from cross bills [sic] and supple-
mental bills, but [could] look to the essence of the matter, and to prin-
ciples which, as regards parties, the federal courts have adopted in
reference to their jurisdiction. 119
This trend is illustrated in cases that concern the equitable joinder
devices of cross-bills and bills of interpleader. If the federal courts had
strictly applied the limits of diversity, these flexible devices would have
had limited usefulness in the federal system. The courts would not
have taken jurisdiction over a cross-bill filed by one defendant against
another defendant from the same state. Similarly, a claimant could not
effectively use a bill of interpleader in federal court if any of the claim-
ants to the property had been citizens of the same state as the party
that filed the bill. After Freeman and Minnesota Co., however, courts
used the original or dependent distinction to justify their jurisdiction
over related claims, even if the assertion of the claim violated strict
diversity.
2 0
This flexible application of equitable procedure is also illustrated
by auxiliary actions that concerned new parties. Parties that were
strangers to the underlying legal action could file bills to enjoin the
enforcement of a judgment after Freeman and Minnesota Co., even if
their presence destroyed diversity.22 Moreover, ancillary jurisdiction




These early cases show that the nineteenth-century doctrine of an-
cillary jurisdiction originated in equity practice. If the federal courts
119. Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas. 667, 669 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1868) (No. 12,450) (cita-
tions omitted).
120. For example, in Schenk, one defendant, Peay, filed a cross-bill against the
other defendant, Bliss, and the plaintiff. Both defendants were citizens of Arkansas, but
the court, citing Freeman and Minnesota Co., took jurisdiction on the grounds that the
bill (1) was necessary to Peay's defense, (2) had not brought new parties into the suit,
and (3) made possible a complete determination of the controversy before the court. Id.
at 669-70. Similarly, in Stone v. Bishop, 23 F. Cas. 154 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878) (No. 13,482),
a federal court took jurisdiction over an action for interpleader because the bill was re-
lated to a legal action already before the court even though one party was from the same
state as the bank that instituted the action. Id. at 154-55.
121. See Pacific R.R. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 111 U.S. 505 (1884); Krippendorf v.
Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); McDonald v. Seligman, 81 F. 753 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897);
Thompson v. McReynolds, 29 F. 657 (W.D. Ark. 1887).
122. See, e.g., Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329 (1987); Labette
County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884); Babcock v. Mil-
lard, 2 F. Cas. 298 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 699).
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were to function as courts of equity, exercise their auxiliary powers to
aid- actions at law, and promote the policies of equity by bringing all
interested parties before the court, they had to circumvent the require-
ment of strict diversity in some cases. Thus, the court developed the
rule that a dependent bill needed no independent basis of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 12 3 Once an original action was before the court, subject




As long as an auxiliary bill concerned an underlying legal action,
the courts generally viewed it as dependent."5 In contrast, a bill sup-
plemental to an equitable action was not so easily categorized. 126 Al-
though courts used the terminology interchangeably and referred to
bills as "dependent," "auxiliary," "supplementary," and "ancillary,"
127
the requirements differed, depending on whether the party filed a bill
to aid an action at law or whether the party filed it to aid an action in
equity.12 In either case, the nineteenth-century federal courts gener-
ously interpreted the requirements for auxiliary and supplementary
bills and allowed new parties to be brought before the court, even if
their presence destroyed strict diversity."19 The doctrine was limited,
however, and the extent of the limitations became the primary issue in
enforcement proceedings.
123. If a bill was dependent, it did not have to include a jurisdictional statement
alleging the citizenship of the parties. See Johnson v. Christian, 125 U.S. 642, 645-46
(1888).
124. See Howards v. Selden, 5 F. 465 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1880) (broad view of ancillary
jurisdiction). Once a federal court properly acquired jurisdiction of a cause, the Howards
court held that:
[J]urisdiction then becomes that of a court of equity proper, and extends to
embrace all acts which it is proper for a court of equity to perform in the cause
before it; for where a court of equity has gained jurisdiction of a cause for one
purpose, it may retain it generally for relief, such as a court of equity may
properly grant in the ordinary exercise of its authority. Among these . . .a
court of equity not only may but should do complete justice as between all
parties before it ... rather than compelling [them] to go out into another fo-
rum for their establishment ....
Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
125. The court developed distinct requirements for these bills. See infra notes 141-
46 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1861) (referring to bill
in question as "ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit, out
of which it had arisen") (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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C. Ancillary Enforcement Jurisdiction
1. The Constitutional Basis of the Doctrine
While the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction generally was justified
as necessary to the proper functioning of a court of equity, the doctrine
of enforcement jurisdiction rested on the more specific and fundamen-
tal requirement that a court be able to enforce its judgments. As Jus-
tice Thompson noted in Bank of the United States v. Halstead,
13
0
"[t]he judicial power would be incomplete, and entirely inadequate to
the purposes for which it was intended" if a federal court could not
enforce its judgments. 131 To ensure this power, the Supreme Court de-
termined that "[tihe jurisdiction of a Court is not exhausted by the
rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be
satisfied.""' Thus, the "judicial power" that the Constitution vested in
the federal judiciary included the power to enforce judgments.
Moreover, in the Process Acts, 3' Congress mandated that federal
circuit courts adopt the modes of process used by the courts of the
state in which the court sat."34 As a result, "the forms of writs and
executions and the modes of process and proceedings were the same,
whether the litigation was in the State court or in the Circuit Court of
the United States."'135 This did not mean, however, that the states
could affect the operation of the federal courts by modifying their legal
procedures. 3 The circuit courts were "wholly independent" from the
courts of the states in which they sat.13
7
Thus, the judicial power encompassed the enforcement power and,
as long as the court was sitting at law, state procedure provided the
130. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825).
131. Id. at 53.
132. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1825); see also Payne v. Hook,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 429-30 (1869) (The right to sue in diversity is of no value "if the
court in which the suit is instituted could not proceed to judgment, and afford a suitable
measure of redress."); Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 187 (1868) ("[I]f
the power is conferred to render the judgment or enter the decree, it also includes the
power to issue proper process to enforce such judgment or decree.") (citation omitted);
United States v. Drennen, 25 F. Cas. 908, 910 (C.C.D. Ark. 1845) (No. 14,992) ("An exe-
cution is said to be the end of the law, and it gives to the successful party the fruits of
his judgment. If a court is competent to pronounce judgment, it must be equally compe-
tent to issue execution to obtain its satisfaction.") (citations omitted).
133. Process Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (1789), amended by Pro-
cess Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (1792).
134. For a discussion of the Process Act's provision for uniform federal equity pro-
cedure, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
135. Riggs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 191.
136. See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 41.
137. Riggs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 196.
[Vol. 42
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/7
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
method used to exercise that power.138 Legal actions in aid of a judg-
ment at law were continuations of the prior action. 139 If the judgment
could not be satisfied in a legal action, then the judgment creditor
could resort to the ancillary remedy of an auxiliary action in equity.
40
This ancillary remedy could bring parties before the court that held
any equitable interest of the judgment debtor.' 4' Moreover, because
the enforcement proceeding was a continuation of the prior action, the
court did not require diversity of citizenship or the jurisdictional
amount.
142
A federal court's ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its judgments was
not without limits. First, the doctrine was strictly limited to the court
that rendered the decree.' 4 ' Second, if the judgment was awarded in a
legal action, the plaintiff had to be unable to satisfy the judgment at
law before he could invoke equitable remedies.144 Third, the enforce-
138. As noted above, federal equity procedure was uniform throughout the federal
judiciary. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 23. Legal actions to enforce judg-
ments included the writs of execution, fieri facias, attachment and garnishment. These
writs were usually viewed as "auxiliary" to the main action, even if the rights of third
parties became involved. See First Nat'l Bank v. Turnbull, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 190 (1872)
(dispute with third party over ownership of property levied on by sheriff was held auxil-
iary to original action and hence not a separate and independent litigation removable to
federal court); Gwin v. Breedlove, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 29 (1844) (a writ of attachment not
an independent suit, but was incidental to the execution of the judgment so that allega-
tion of citizenship was unnecessary to the jurisdiction of the court); Pratt v. Albright, 9
F. 634 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1881) (postjudgment proceedings in garnishment auxiliary to prior
action and not removable to federal court). But see Tunstall v. Worthington, 24 F. Cas.
324 (C.C.D. Ark. 1853) (No. 14,239) (under Arkansas garnishment statute, proceeding
must be seen as an independent civil suit which requires diversity of citizenship).
140. See Case v. Bdauregard, 101 U.S. 688 (1879). In Case the Court held that if the
debtor's ownership interest is merely equitable, the court does not have to require "fruit-
less" attempts to reach it by legal means. Id. at 691.
141. See Marsh v. Burroughs, 16 F. Cas. 800, 802 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 9,112);
see also Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884).
In Labette County the Supreme Court approved the use of a writ of mandamus to re-
quire a governmental entity that was not a party to the original action to pay a judg-
ment. The party had a duty to pay under the statutes of the State of Kansas. The Court
noted that "it does not follow because the jurisdiction in mandamus is ancillary merely
that it cannot be exercised over persons not parties to the judgment sought to be en-
forced." Id. at 221. The Court reasoned that the real question was whether the county
commissioners, to whom the writ was addressed, had a legal duty to pay the judgment.
Id. The Court noted that if a duty existed, "then they are, as here, the legal representa-
tives of the defendant in [the judgment already obtained], as being the parties on whom
the law has cast the duty of providing for its satisfaction." Id.
142. See Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937).
143. See Claflin v. McDermott, 12 F. 375 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Winter v. Swinburne,
8 F. 49 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1881).
144. See Judiciary Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789)
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ment proceeding had to be a mere continuation of the prior action, not
an action based on new grounds.'45 However, the presence of a new
party did not by itself relieve the court of jurisdiction. ' 46
2. Application of the Doctrine
These rules were not always easily applied. For example, in Buford
& Co. v. Strother & Conklin'47 the court, facing three requests for re-
moval of garnishment actions148 from state to federal court, struggled
to formulate a method by which those enforcement proceedings, or
"supplemental proceedings," which were merely continuations of the
prior action could be distinguished from those that were separate and
independent. 149 The court remarked:
It is idle to say that a supplemental proceeding cannot be removed
because it is an appendage or sequence of the original suit. This is, at
best, but reasoning in a circle. It is as if one were to affirm that a
supplemental proceeding cannot be removed because it is a supple-
mental proceeding.110
The court determined that, as long as the supplemental proceeding was
simply a "mode of execution or of relief that was inseparably con-
nected with the original judgment or decree," it was not a separate
action, even though a new controversy might arise between the judg-
ment creditor and a third party. 1 If the supplemental proceeding
raised an independent controversy with a new party, rather than
merely seeking to execute the judgment, then it was held a separate
action and hence removable to federal court.12
Of the three cases faced by the court in Buford, the court ad-
judged only one to be proper for removal. In that case the plaintiff had
(limits the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts to situations in which no adequate
legal remedy exists). The federal court could take jurisdiction in equity even though a
judgment creditor might have a legal remedy in state court. See, e.g., United States v.
Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108 (1819) (The Circuit Court of Massachusetts
had jurisdiction of an equitable bill filed against debtors of the judgment debtor, even
though a legal remedy existed in state court.). Moreover, if legal remedies would be obvi-
ously unproductive, the judgment creditor was not required to pursue them. See, e.g.,
Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688 (1879).
145. See Anglo-Florida Phosphate Co. v. McKibben, 65 F. 529 (5th Cir. 1894).
146. See Pacific R.R. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 111 U.S. 505, 522 (1884).
147. 10 F. 406 (C.C.D. Iowa 1881).
148. See supra note 11 and infra note 183 (discussing the split between the federal
courts on the issue of whether garnishment actions are separate for removal purposes).
149. Buford & Co,, 10 F. at 406-10.
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an unsatisfied state court judgment against a corporation and subse-
quently brought an action for fraud against a director and a stock-
holder of the corporation. The court noted that the plaintiff did not
merely seek to reach the assets of the corporation that were in the
hands of the defendant. Rather, he brought a "distinct and indepen-
dent" claim against those defendants.153 The claim, if proved, would
have established "a new liability against these new parties."1 4
3. Summary
The cases show that the addition of a new and nondiverse party in
an enforcement proceeding was permissible as long as the enforcement
proceeding was limited to enforcing the prior judgment. 155 If the plain-
tiff's only claim against the third party concerned assets of the judg-
ment debtor held by that third party, then the enforcement proceeding
was a "mere mode of execution" and, thus, a continuation of the origi-
nal action. 56 If the plaintiff sought to use the enforcement action to
raise a new claim that was unrelated to those assets against the new
party, however, the enforcement action was no longer a continuation of
the main action.'57 It became an original action and thus required a
separate basis for federal jurisdiction. 58
153. Id. at 409-10.
154. Id. at 410.
155. See Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937).
156. See Buford & Co. v. Strother & Conklin, 10 F. 406, 408 (C.C.D. Iowa 1881)
("[T]he process of garnishment after judgment is clearly a mode of execution. Its pur-
pose is to obtain satisfaction of the judgment out of the debtor's effects which may be in
a third person's hands.").
157. See id. at 409. Another example of this distinction is found in Anglo-Florida
Phosphate Co. v. McKibben, 65 F. 529 (5th Cir. 1894). In Anglo-Florida Phosphate Co.
the plaintiff in a diversity action asked for an accounting of a partnership's assets. After
he received a favorable ruling in the initial action, he attempted to adjudicate by supple-
mentary proceedings the title to a parcel of land that the defendant partners sold before
the filing of the action for an accounting. Because the supplemental bill named the new
owners of the property as new parties and asserted the new theory of relief that the
transfer of property was detrimental to the partnership, the court viewed the bill as
original and not dependent. Moreover, because one of the new parties and the plaintiff
were both citizens of Florida, the court held that federal jurisdiction was not proper. The
court was concerned that the plaintiff had attempted to circumvent the diversity re-
quirements by declining to name the Florida party in the original action, even though
the sale had already taken place when he filed the original law suit. Id. at 529-32.
158. See Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 2 (1834) (requires diversity if an injunc-
tion bill is considered an original bill).
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II. COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION AND MODERN
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Most scholars trace the development of modern ancillary jurisdic-
tion to Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,'59 a 1926 Supreme Court
decision.100 Moore may be viewed as a continuation of the line of nine-
teenth-century ancillary decisions. It was an action in equity, and the
main claim, which was antitrust, was properly in federal court.161
Moreover, the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction as the
primary claim and was, therefore, presumably compulsory under the
federal rules of equity.1 6 2 In fact, the Court evidently relied on equita-
ble principles: "[T]he relief afforded by the dismissal of the bill is not
complete without an injunction restraining appellant from continuing
to obtain by stealthy appropriation what the court had held it could
not have by judicial compulsion.
1 6 3
Viewed in the context of nineteenth-century equitable principles
and procedure, Moore appears unremarkable. However, Moore was not
viewed in that context when the Supreme Court decided it. Instead,
the early twentieth-century federal courts had developed a list of mat-
ters suitable for the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts.164 The
list enabled federal courts to assert ancillary jurisdiction "(1) to aid,
enjoin, or regulate the original suit; (2) to restrain, avoid, explain, or
enforce the judgment or decree therein; or (3) to enforce or obtain an
adjudication of liens upon, or claims to, property in the custody of the
court in the original suit."165
159. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
160. See, e.g., 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 3523, at 93.
161. See Moore, 270 U.S. at 608-09.
162. Id. at 609.
163. Id. at 610.
164. The earliest use of this approach appeared in Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193
U.S. 93 (1904), in which the Supreme Court considered the ancillary powers of the fed-
eral courts to be (1) a bill of revivor continuing a prior litigation filed in the same court
by the same parties or their representatives standing in the same interest; (2) a bill to
enforce a judgment obtained in a prior suit filed in the same court by the same or addi-
tional parties standing in the same interest; (3) a bill filed to prevent a party from using
the court for fraudulent purposes or to perpetuate an injustice; (4) a bill to obtain equi-
table relief connected with any judgment or proceeding at law rendered in the same
court; and (5) a bill filed to assert any claim, title, or right to property in the custody of
the court. Id. at 113-14 (citing 1 C. BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE § 97, at 110
(1901)),
165. Campbell v. Golden Cycle Mining Co., 141 F. 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1905). The list
loosely corresponds to the auxiliary powers of equity, that is, it delineates those areas in
which equity could assist parties to a legal action. For some reason, the power of a fed-
eral court of equity to take jurisdiction of dependent supplemental bills in the absence of
strict diversity is absent from the list. See Putnam v. New Albany, 20 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.D.
[Vol. 42
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In one of the first cases to interpret Moore, Lewis v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp.,'166 the court focused on the distinction between
the three-part list of ancillary powers and the Moore ruling. After re-
citing the list, the court noted that before Moore "the scope of ancil-
lary jurisdiction depend[ed] only upon the subject-matter of [the] sup-
plemental proceeding." " In other words, if the ancillary claim
concerned a matter on the list, federal jurisdiction was permissible. Af-
ter Moore, ancillary jurisdiction included "any claim[s] arising out of
the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit." '16 8 In the Lewis
court's view, the federal courts could now analyze the factual relation-
ship between the primary action and the ancillary claim to determine
if jurisdiction was proper.16 9 Accordingly, after Moore, courts began to
define ancillary jurisdiction in terms of the subject-matter of the law-
suit, not in terms of the three-part list.
In the context of the primary action, Moore's same-transaction
test provided a useful way to analyze the factual relationship of the
ancillary claim to the main action. It was, in effect, a way to determine
whether the bill was dependent or original, as equitable procedure re-
quired.1 7 0 Thus, Moore at least indirectly followed the line of nine-
teenth-century ancillary jurisdiction cases. The requirement of fact re-
latedness, however, has no application to enforcement proceedings.
Most actions to enforce money judgments against third parties are
analogous to auxiliary actions in equity.' As noted above, auxiliary
actions were considered to be dependent by their very nature.1 72 Thus,
they were part of the case or controversy as long as they were a contin-
uation of the primary action. In effect, to apply the fact-relatedness
test to enforcement actions confuses the auxiliary powers of equity
Ind. 1869) (No. 13,482); Schenk v. Peay, 2 F. Cas. 667 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1868) (No. 12,450).
166. 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1939).
167. Id. at 115. By "subject-matter" the court apparently meant "purpose," because
the court believed that ancillary jurisdiction was limited to the three types of bills listed
in Campbell. The court also asserted that "ancillary jurisdiction over the subject-matter
may be obtained even though the supplemental proceeding brings in new parties." Id.
168. Lewis, 29 F. Supp. at 116 (The Lewis court erroneously attributes this quote,
apparently from rule 30 of the Federal Equity Rules, to Cleveland Eng'g Co. v. Galion
Dynamic Motor Truck Co., 243 F. 405 (N.D. Ohio 1917)). See id. at 115.
169. Id. at 116.
170. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 54-72 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between dependent bills and original
bills).
171. Today if a judgment creditor wants to reach the judgment debtor's assets,
which are in the hands of third parties, he uses supplementary proceedings. Supplemen-
tary proceedings are a statutory enforcement method that takes the place of the credi-
tor's bill in equity. See supra note 11.
172. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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with the requirements of a supplemental bill in equity.
Moreover, the requirement of fact relatedness would unduly limit
the jurisdiction of a federal court to enforce its judgments. In the typi-
cal enforcement proceeding, the judgment creditor is entitled to ex-
amine the assets of the judgment debtor, including those assets held by
others.1 7 3 Claims that the debtor has against third parties are normally
unrelated to the subject matter of the lawsuit.17 4 Thus, if the court
applies the fact-relatedness requirement, these claims would almost
never be properly brought in federal court. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the federal courts have the same power to enforce
their judgments as the courts of the states in which they sit.1h If the
courts apply the requirement of fact relatedness to enforcement pro-
ceedings, a federal court actually would have less enforcement power
than the state court, because it would normally be unable to bring
third parties into the enforcement proceeding.
If the enforcement proceeding is viewed as a dependent action, as
"a mere mode of execution or of relief,"'' 7 then the court's subject
matter jurisdiction depends on its jurisdiction over the primary action.
Jurisdiction is proper as long as the enforcement proceeding is limited
to enforcing the prior judgment, even if new parties are brought into
the proceeding.177 If the judgment creditor seeks to use the enforce-
ment proceeding to litigate a new and independent claim against the
173. See FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a); see also supra note 11.
174. For example, the third party might be an insurance company that contractually
agreed to pay any claims against the judgment debtor in certain circumstances. The
transaction litigated in the main lawsuit usually will have no factual relationship with
the insurance contract. Cf. Berry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (basis of the
enforcement proceeding, an alleged oral contract between a police officer and his munici-
pal employer, is different from the basis of the primary action, a § 1983 action against
the officer).
175. See FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a); see also Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1984); Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
ex rel. Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979);
Gabovitch v. Lundy, 584 F.2d 559 (1st Cir. 1978); Chambers v. Blickle Ford Sales, Inc.,
313 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1963); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 101 F.R.D.
779 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Mission Bay Campland v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 432 (M.D.
Fla. 1976); Nelson v. Maiden, 402 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
176. Buford & Co. v. Strother & Conklin, 10 F. 406, 407 (C.C.D. Iowa 1881).
177. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. If the third party challenges
the existence of the debt, then the court must hold hearings to determine its validity.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-19-290 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (South Carolina attachment statute pro-
vides that third party in possession of attached property may force trial on issue of his
rights to that property). In fact, in some states, if the third party challenges the judg-
ment creditor's right to property, the third party has a right to a jury trial. In Berry the
district court's actions implied that the federal court should have jurisdiction over this
type of action. See Ber, 795 F.2d at 454 (noting that the district court had held a jury
trial on the garnishment claims).
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third party, however, then a separate basis for jurisdiction must exist.
The question presented is not whether the enforcement proceeding is
factually related to the primary action, but whether the enforcement
proceeding's purpose is to reach assets of the judgment debtor so that
the judgment can be satisfied. Thus, if the purpose is limited, then the
federal court has jurisdiction.
H. APPLICATION OF ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION
This rule could have been usefully applied in three recent deci-
sions by United States Courts of Appeals."78 All three presented super-
ficially similar situations. In each case the plaintiffs sought recovery in
section 1983 actions against police officers and their municipal employ-
ers. All three courts rendered judgments against the officers, but exon-
erated the municipality of direct liability. Each plaintiff then sought to
bring the municipality back before the court in the enforcement pro-
ceeding. At this point, the plaintiffs each asserted a different theory of
municipal liability for the torts of employees.
A. Berry v. McLemore
1"8
In Berry the plaintiff argued that officials of the Town of Maben,
Mississippi, orally promised the defendant, McLemore, that the town
would pay any judgment entered against him. The district court took
jurisdiction over the dispute and awarded the town a directed ver-
dict.180 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court
did not have jurisdiction because of lack of diversity.181
The court's opinion primarily rested on a procedural rationale.
The plaintiff sought to use a writ of garnishment to enforce the judg-
ment, and the Fifth Circuit considers garnishment actions against
third parties to be separate and independent from the underlying ac-
tion.182 This rule, derived from Butler v. Polk,'83 illustrates the prob-
178. See Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483 (7th Cir. 1988); Skevofi-
lax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); Berry v. McLe-
more, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986).
179. 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986).
180. Id. at 453. The district court ruled that, under Mississippi law, the town could
not be subject to a writ of garnishment, because Officer McLemore had not first obtained
a judgment against the town. Id. at 454.
181. Id. at 455-56.
182. Id. at 455.
183. 592 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1979). In Butler, a third-party, out-of-state insurer re-
moved the garnishment action from state to federal court on the grounds that Missis-
sippi courts considered garnishment actions to be separate suits. The Fifth Circuit held
that removal was proper, not on the state law grounds, but on the grounds that other
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lem with viewing all garnishment actions as separate from the main
lawsuit. Under this view, even if the town did not dispute its responsi-
bility to pay the judgment of its employee, the federal court still would
not have been able to enforce the town's duty to pay; the garnishment
action would be a separate and independent action under any set of
facts and would, therefore, need a separate jurisdictional base. A rule
that limits the enforcement power of a federal court to that extent is
not justified by either case law or policy.18 4
The court would have reached a different result if it had applied
the rules of enforcement jurisdiction. The plaintiff used a three-part
argument. First, Berry argued that the town orally promised McLe-
more that it would pay any judgment against him. Second, he argued
that, in reliance on the town's promise, McLemore did not seek inde-
pendent counsel for the trial. Third, Berry contended that the attorney
provided by the town had a conflict of interest at trial that adversely
affected McLemore's interests.' s5 When the plaintiff argued that the
town had a contractual duty to pay McLemore's judgment, in effect, he
was arguing that the town held an asset of the judgment debtor that
could be used to satisfy the judgment. Therefore, the enforcement pro-
ceeding could have been viewed as a continuation of the prior action.
Moreover, the detrimental reliance and conflict of interest claims
against the town simply expanded the enforcement action to include
new theories of the town's liability to McLemore.' 88 As long as he lim-
ited these theories to the town's liability to the judgment debtor, how-
ever, jurisdiction should have been proper.
s7
federal courts considered garnishment actions to be separate. Id. at 1295-96.
Whether garnishment actions can be characterized as separate for removal purposes
is a question that has received uneven treatment from the federal courts. For a review of
the cases, see 1A J. MOORE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.167[12] (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Annotation, What
Constitutes Ancillary, Incidental, or Auxiliary Causes of Action, So As to Preclude Its
Removal from State to Federal Court, 18 A.L.R. FED. 126 (1974); Annotation, Removabil-
ity to Federal Court of Garnishment Proceedings, 22 A.L.R.2d 904 (1952). The Supreme
Court has not recently addressed this question, but both policy considerations and ex-
isting Supreme Court precedents militate against a per se rule of separateness. See Bar-
row v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1879); First Nat'l Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
190 (1873); cf. Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. 281 (1881) (after recovering judgment
against uncles for a share of a plantation, plaintiff-grandson brought an action against
third party who had purchased a parcel of the subject property; this action held separate
and independent from original lawsuit).
184. See supra note 183.
185. Berry v. MoLemore, 795 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 1986).
186. See id. at 455.
187. The court should have jurisdiction to reach even intangible assets and rights of
the judgment debtor in an enforcement proceeding. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126
(1881). See also 9 T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW V 37A.11[B], at %U 37A-115
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The plaintiff argued that the court had ancillary jurisdiction to
enforce its judgment and the Berry court responded with an ancillary
analysis: "We can find no case where a court held that it had ancillary
jurisdiction to consider claims in a new and independent action merely
because the second action sought to satisfy or give additional meaning
to an earlier judgment."'188 Having decided that all garnishment actions
are independent, the court could not find the action to be ancillary
without contradicting itself.18 9 In an attempt to explain its reasoning,
however, the court noted that because the enforcement action was in
contract while the original action had been in tort, "the basis of the
garnishment proceedings and the basis of the claim against McLemore
are different."9 0 Thus, even if the garnishment action had not been an
independent action, and even if the town did not dispute its responsi-
bility to pay the judgment, the court would not have taken jurisdiction
under its fact-based ancillary analysis.
If the court had applied the equitable principles of enforcement
jurisdiction, it would have focused on the relationship of the third
party to the judgment debtor's assets, not on the relationship of the
claims in the two proceedings. As it stands, the precedent set by Berry
is troublesome: under its view of garnishment actions and of ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction over a nondiverse third
party would never be proper in a garnishment action, even if the third
party had an undisputed duty to pay the federal court judgment.
B. Skevofilax v. Quigley' 9'
In Skevofilax the Township of Edison's obligation to pay the po-
lice officers' judgment also rested on contractual grounds. In this case,
the contract was written and unambiguous.'"' The Third Circuit rested
through -118 (1989); Annotation, Judgment Debtor's Personal Injury Claims Against
Third Person or Latter's Liability Insurer As Subject to Creditor's Bill, 51 A.L.R.2d 595
(1957). Because a court has jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, however, does not mean
that the state law in question provides a way to reach the assets the plaintiff seeks. For
example, in many jurisdictions, including Mississippi, unliquidated claims are not sub-
ject to garnishment. See, e.g., Bates v. Forsyth, 69 Ga. 365 (1882); Dibrell v. Neely, 61
Miss. 218 (1883); Friedman v. Mandelbaum, 25 N.J. Misc. 157, 51 A.2d 260 (1947);
Lomerson v. Huffman, 25 N.J.L. 625 (1856); Barber v. Esty, 19 Vt. 131 (1847). Conse-
quently, the district court judge held that Berry's attempted garnishment of McLemore's
contract claim against the Town of Maben was improper. See Berry, 795 F.2d at 454.
188. Berry, 795 F.2d at 455 (emphasis in original).
189. See 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 182, at 0.167 [12].
190. Berry, 795 F.2d at 455.
191. 810 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
192. The township had a collective bargaining agreement with the police union,
which provided that "[i]n the event of a judgment against a member of the bargaining
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its decision that jurisdiction was proper on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Because the court believed that New Jersey procedure pro-
vided a way to proceed against the township in this situation, it found
jurisdiction under Rule 69(a). 193 As an alternative, the court reasoned
that when the police officers joined plaintiff's motion to enforce the
judgment, in effect, they made a Rule 13(g) cross-claim against the
town.0 4 Thus, jurisdiction could rest on the court's ancillary power to
hear such a claim.
The dissent attacked the majority's Rule 69 reasoning. First, the
dissent argued that New Jersey procedure did not consider an action
for garnishment to be part of the original proceeding unless the debtor
admitted the debt.0 5 If the debtor denied the debt, as the town did in
this case, state law required a new and independent proceeding to be
filed.0 6 As the majority's discussion of Rule 69 implied, however, the
dissent's analysis failed to take into account that the Rules can neither
confer nor take away subject matter jurisdiction.1 7 Although Rule 69
incorporates state procedure for the purpose of enforcing judgments,
state procedure cannot deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. 98
Judge Becker concurred with the majority opinion, but argued
that it was too broad: "[It] appears to assume the broad proposition
that a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over any effort to enforce
its judgments regardless of whether the adjudication of the defendant's
claim for funds involves facts and defendants unrelated to the original
dispute."' 19 As an alternative to the majority's Rule 69(a) approach, he
urged the application of the three-step unified theory and noted that
the enforcement proceeding "required an analysis of the same factual
unit arising out of or incidental to the performance of his duty, the Employer agrees to
pay for said judgment or arrange for the payment of said judgment." Id. at 379. The
court determined in the underlying action the one condition precedent to its application,
whether the judgment arose out of the performance of the police officer's duty. Thus, the
township did not argue that any factual issues were in dispute. Instead, it argued that
the indemnity clause was void under New Jersey law. Id. at 380.
193. Id. at 383-85. The court correctly noted that, under "[r]ule 69 the same relief is
available in federal court for the satisfaction of a federal court judgment as would be
available in a state court. Rule 69 does not contemplate that the holders of federal judg-
ments must resort to state tribunals for their enforcement." Id. at 384.
194. Id. at 385-86.
195. Id. at 390-91.
196. Id. at 391 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82, which provides in part that "[tihese rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the
venue of actions therein."
198. See Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378, 384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1029 (1987) (New Jersey statutes that set forth procedures do not have "anything at all
to do with federal court jurisdiction.").
199. Id. at 388.
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events at issue in the principal litigation," that "no federal policy
counsels against jurisdiction," and that interests of convenience, judi-
cial economy, and fairness weighed in favor of jurisdiction.
200
The difficulty with Judge Becker's analysis is that the question
whether the collective bargaining agreement violated New Jersey pub-
lic policy, which was posed by the enforcement proceeding, did not sat-
isfy the "common nucleus of operative fact" test. It had no factual re-
lationship to the section 1983 claim. Moreover, the question was
primarily one of state law, concerning the type of state issues that fed-
eral courts usually are reluctant to address. In effect, Judge Becker's
resolution of the jurisdictional question under the unified theory ap-
proach depended on how he framed the issues posed by the enforce-
ment proceeding. Moreover, the result of his analysis is a rule that
would not allow the federal courts to reach the judgment debtor's as-
sets that are held by third parties unless that claim has a "sufficient
nexus to the original dispute." 0' 1 This rule is more limited than
necessary.
If the court had applied the principles of enforcement jurisdiction,
the analysis would have focused on the purpose of the action against
the township: did the township hold assets of the judgment debtor, or
did the plaintiffs seek to add a new and independent theory of liability
to their claim. In this case, a collective bargaining agreement provided
that the township would be responsible for any judgment against a po-
lice officer "arising out of or incidental to the performance of his
duty."202 Because the purpose of the action against the township was
simply to enforce its contractual duty to the police officers, the court
properly exercised jurisdiction.
C. Argento v. Village of Melrose Park
2 3
In Argento state law obligated the municipal employer to pay the
tort judgments of its employees. Its liability to the police officers was
statutory and not contractual. 0 4 After reviewing Berry and Skevofilax,
200. Id. at 389-90.
201. Id. at 388. Judge Becker stated: "Many enforcement actions are not truly ancil-
lary. That the original parties pursue an action to provide the defendant with funds for
satisfaction of the original judgment does not itself provide a sufficient nexus to the
original dispute." Id.
202. Id. at 379.
203. 838 F.2d 1483 (7th Cir. 1988).
204. Id. at 1493. The Village of Melrose Park argued that the court did not apply
the appropriate statute. See id. For enforcement jurisdiction purposes, however, which
state indemnity statute applied was irrelevant: if the village owed a duty to the police
officers under either statute, then they were a party that held an asset of the judgment
1991]
31
Glenn: Federal Supplemental Enforcement Jurisdiction
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the court decided that to determine jurisdiction, the crucial issue was
whether the enforcement action was a separate action. Under Illinois
precedent, a party could have brought a claim to enforce the state em-
ployee indemnification statute in the primary action. Consequently,
the court determined that an action enforcing that statute was not a
separate action.20 6 This rationale is flawed: even if the Illinois courts
interpreted the statute to require an independent action, the federal
court should not have denied jurisdiction on the basis of state law.2"8
If equitable enforcement principles had been used, the analysis
would have been almost identical to the analysis in Labette County
Commissioners v. United States ex rel. Moulton.20 7 The issue in La-
bette County Commissioners was whether the applicable statute made
the village "the part[y] on whom the law . . . cast the duty [to pay]
the judgment.'" 208 Because it did, the enforcement proceeding was a
mere mode of execution, not an attempt to bring a new claim against
the village.
One problem in Argento was the wording of the state statute at
issue. The statute provided that "[a] local public entity [is] empowered
and directed to pay any tort judgment or settlement for which it or an
employee while acting within the scope of his employment is liable.
'20 9
The village argued that it was "not a third party indebted to the judg-
ment debtor" because the statute made the village directly liable to the
judgment creditor. Thus, the village argued, the case was improperly
before the court.210 The court declined to address this assertion be-
cause the parties did not raise it below and it was a procedural rather
than a jurisdictional issue. 211
When read literally, however, this statute could present problems
of enforcement jurisdiction because an enforcement proceeding is not a
dependent action if the judgment creditor uses it to assert a direct
claim against the third party.212 The statute's wording forces the judg-
ment creditor into a direct claim posture and, thus, the enforcement
proceeding appears to be independent. However, this view is superfi-
cial. The effect of the statute is to indemnify public employees. Al-
though the wording of the statute makes the liability direct, it does not
change the statute's effect. Under the statute the village was "the
debtor and, thus, were properly before the court. Id.
205. Id. at 1487-90.
206. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
207. 112 U.S. 217 (1884). For a discussion of this opinion, see supra note 141.
208. Labette County Comm'rs, 112 U.S. at 221.
209. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 9-102 (1978) (amended 1986).
210. Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1489 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988).
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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part[y] on whom the law.. . cast the duty [to pay the judgment], ' 213
and jurisdiction over the village was proper. 14
In dissent, Judge Manion applied the unified theory and argued
that the state interests at stake far outweighed the interests of judicial
economy or convenience to the litigants. 21 5 In his view, the case was
analogous to Berry: "Plaintiffs claim sought to obtain new judgments
against new parties based on new state law theories of liabil-
ity-without any showing that the resolution of these matters in fed-
eral court would better serve the interests of the parties or the judicial
system."2 1
The dissent's argument illustrates the inappropriateness of apply-
ing modern ancillary jurisdiction analysis to questions of enforcement
jurisdiction. First, it ignores the strong federal policy that a federal
court should have the power to enforce its own judgments. Second, by
viewing the enforcement action as a separate action that raised only
state law issues, the dissent asserted a rule that, if it had prevailed,
would make enforcement of any federal court judgment against a non-
diverse third party impossible, even if that third party's obligation to
the judgment debtor was clear.
21 7
IV. CONCLUSION
When a federal court takes jurisdiction over enforcement proceed-
ings under Rule 69, the court's power may extend to a third party, as
long as the proceeding is limited to reaching the judgment debtor's as-
sets that are in the hands of the third party. Those assets may be in-
tangibles such as contract rights or choses in action, and the third
party may contest their ownership. If the proceeding is limited to adju-
dicating the liability of the third party to the judgment debtor, juris-
diction-is proper. Only when the judgment creditor seeks to introduce
213. Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217, 221
(1884).
214. If the wording of a statute could make its enforcement a new action, then the
state legislature would have the power to limit the federal court's jurisdiction simply by
making the duty to pay a tort judgment flow directly to the judgment creditor. This
result is contrary to federal law. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
215. Argento v. Village of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1501-03 (7th Cir. 1988) (Ma-
nion, J., dissenting). He argued: "It]he exercise of federal jurisdiction over these claims
intrudes into Illinois' substantial interest in developing and applying its own law." Id. at
1502 (Manion, J., dissenting). If Judge Manion's view prevailed, enforcement proceed-
ings would almost never be properly in federal court because most enforcement proceed-
ings raise state law issues.
216. Id. at 1503 (Manion, J., dissenting).




Glenn: Federal Supplemental Enforcement Jurisdiction
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a new theory of the third party's direct liability to him does the en-
forcement proceeding become a separate action.
Although enforcement proceedings may be ancillary in the loose
sense of the word, they are not suitable for analysis under the unified
theory, which focuses on the factual relationship between the claim
against the third party and the primary claim. Rather than focusing on
fact relatedness, the court should merely inquire whether the third
party has assets of the judgment debtor that can be used to satisfy the
judgment. If so, then the enforcement proceeding is simply a continua-
tion of the primary action and jurisdiction is proper.
When the Constitution vested judicial power in the federal courts
and provided that judicial power would be exercised in both law and
equity, it impliedly extended federal jurisdiction to enforcement pro-
ceedings. Thus, these proceedings are normally within the federal judi-
cial power, not outside of it.218 They are not ancillary as that term is
used today, and to view them this way only confuses the issue, as
Berry, Skevofilax, and Argento illustrate.
Susan M. Glenn
218. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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